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BEYOND THE SAR-C: BEST PRACTICES
FOR GAMING COMPANIES TO “KNOW
THEIR CUSTOMER” AND AVOID
ORGANIZATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING
LIABILITY IN THE POST-SANDS CLIMATE
Joseph Rillotta*
Recently, federal prosecutors and law enforcement agents have taken
novel and aggressive actions to address the laundering of illicit funds through
U.S.-based gaming companies. On the heels of a criminal investigation con-
cerning the Las Vegas Sands Corporation (“Sands”), which operates one of
Nevada’s largest casino complexes,1 regulators are urging gaming companies
to be more diligent in filing Suspicious Activity Reports for Casinos (SARs or
SAR-Cs) with the U.S. Treasury,2 as federal law requires when patrons engage
in suspected money laundering.3 Regulators and prosecutors, however, have
also made clear that merely filing a SAR-C does not necessarily discharge a
gaming company’s legal responsibilities; nor does it necessarily insulate a com-
pany from liability arising from a patron’s money laundering activity.4 In the
aftermath of the Sands investigation, federal and state regulators are also
encouraging casinos to enhance their anti-money laundering (“AML”) controls,
to ensure compliance with AML regulations, and to take more proactive steps
to “know their customers”—that is, to take measures that give casinos reasona-
ble assurances that their patrons are not gambling with, or engaging in any
other transactions with, illegally-acquired money.5
Part I of this article summarizes the events giving rise to the Sands investi-
gation, the non-prosecution agreement that the Sands Corporation entered into
with the government to resolve that matter, and the subsequent statements of
prosecutors and regulators concerning their broader AML enforcement efforts.
Then, Part II suggests a series of measures gaming companies may consider
putting in place, in light of the Sands case and other recent developments, in
* Joseph Rillotta is an attorney practicing in Washington, D.C., and a former prosecutor
with the U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division. His practice areas include tax, criminal
defense, internal investigations, and corporate governance and compliance.
1 State of Nev. Gaming Control Bd., 2014 Listing of Financial Statements Square Footage,
10 (Jan. 13, 2015, 11:02 AM) http://gaming.nv.gov/modules/showdocument.aspx?document
id=3428.
2 See generally Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Dir., Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Prepared
Remarks at the Global Gaming Expo (Sept. 24, 2013), available at http://www.fincen.gov/
news_room/speech/pdf/20130924.pdf.
3 31 C.F.R. § 1021.320(a)–(b) (2014).
4 See infra Part I.A.
5 See Shasky Calvery, supra note 2, at 2–6; see also infra Part I.B.
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order to strengthen their compliance efforts and minimize their exposure under
the federal money laundering laws.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Zhenli Ye Gon and the Sands Casinos
In early 2005, a Mexican national named Zhenli Ye Gon introduced him-
self to hosts and staff at the Venetian and Palazzo casinos, adjacent properties
both indirectly owned and operated by Sands.6 Ye Gon submitted a credit
application to the Venetian, stating that he was in the “chemical business.”7 He
passed his credit check and presented a valid form of identification.8 Casino
staff ran Ye Gon’s name against the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Con-
trol (OFAC) “prohibited parties” lists.9 Because Ye Gon did not appear on any
of the lists, the Venetian and Palazzo cleared him to gamble.10 Each casino
recorded and monitored Ye Gon’s play in accordance with federal and state
regulations.11 Ye Gon played big.12
By late 2006, Ye Gon was the largest “cash up front” gambler the Vene-
tian had ever seen.13 Between February 2005 and March 2007, Ye Gon wire
transferred approximately $45 million to the Venetian and Palazzo, and he
deposited an additional $13 million in cashier’s checks.14 By March 2007, Ye
Gon had used most of these funds (and additional funds fronted by the casinos)
to play table games, including in the Venetian and Palazzo’s private gaming
rooms.15 All in all, Ye Gon lost—and Sands gained—over $53 million as a
result of his play.16 This was enough for casino management to take note; in
fact, Ye Gon’s business was substantial enough to affect the bonuses of Vene-
tian and Sands executives.17 At operational meetings, “they discussed how Ye
Gon had become such a large gambler in a relatively short period of time and
discussed the source of his funds.”18 The executives concluded that the Vene-
6 Non-Prosecution Agreement Between the Las Vegas Sands Corp. and the U.S. Att’ys
Office for the Cent. Dist. of Calif., Attachment A ¶ 10 (Aug. 26, 2013), reprinted in 17
GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 584, 586 (2013) [hereinafter Sands Non-Pros. Agreement];
Michael Luo, Las Vegas Casino Settles in Money-Laundering Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, at A16
(Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/28/us/las-vegas-casino-settles-in-money-
laundering-inquiry.html?_r=0. See also Jorge Carrasco, Mexico, the DEA, and the Case of
Zhenli Ye Gon, WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/28/AR2008102801364.html.
7 Sands Non-Pros. Agreement, supra note 6, at 587.




12 Id. at 587–88.
13 Id. at 587.
14 Id. at 586.
15 Id. at 588–89.
16 Id. at 588.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 590.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\5-2\NVG201.txt unknown Seq: 3  3-JUN-15 15:13
Fall 2014] BEST PRACTICES FOR GAMING COMPANIES 147
tian’s continued business with Ye Gon “was very good financially,” and proac-
tively cultivated the relationship.19
This outlook changed abruptly on March 15, 2007, when Mexican authori-
ties executed a search on Ye Gon’s Mexico City home, seizing seven weapons
and more than $207 million worth of U.S. currency.20 Within several months,
Ye Gon was arrested in Maryland and charged in the District of Columbia with
conspiracy to import methamphetamine into the United States.21 A Drug
Enforcement Administration agent’s affidavit, filed in support of Ye Gon’s
arrest warrant, confirmed that Ye Gon was in the pharmaceutical business, but
it stated that in 2005, he began supplying methamphetamine ingredients to drug
dealers.22 According to the DEA affidavit, “a Mexican organized crime
group . . . . wanted to store cash at Ye Gon’s residence in Mexico City,” and
ultimately “wanted Ye Gon to launder their money” in Las Vegas.23 Together
with the U.S. currency, guns, and various other items seized from his home,
authorities found Ye Gon’s “player’s club” cards from Las Vegas casinos.24
Prior to the March 2007 search of Ye Gon’s home, Sands had not reported
any of his gambling activity as suspicious.25 Sands had, however, filed numer-
ous Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs) with the Treasury’s Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).26 But only once, on April 18, 2007,
did the company file a SAR-C,27 which is required for any transaction of at
least $5,000 where a casino “knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect that the
transaction . . . [i]nvolves funds derived from illegal activity.”28 The U.S.
Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California found this SAR-C lack-
ing, both because it was late and because prosecutors deemed Sands’ disclo-
sures to be insufficient.29 Prosecutors described that, in their view, Venetian
and Palazzo personnel disregarded a series of “red flags” that were raised while
their top “cash up front” client gambled and lost unprecedented amounts of
money at their casinos.30  For example:
19 Id.; see also Mark Stevenson & Michael Rubinkam, Drug Suspect Accuses Mexican Offi-
cial, WASH. POST (July 3, 2007, 12:27 AM), http://www.washington post.com/wpdyn/con
tent/article/2007/07/02/AR2007070200157_pf.html (“He was such a treasured customer that
the Venetian Resort Hotel Casino gave him a Rolls-Royce.”).
20 Sands Non-Pros. Agreement, supra note 6, at 588; Chavez Affidavit in Support of Com-
plaint & Arrest Warrant for Zhenli Ye Gon at ¶¶ 10, 20–21, United States v. Ye Gon, No.
1:07-cr-00181-EGS (D.D.C. June 15, 2007), available at http://ia600407.us.archive.org/21/
items/gov.uscourts.dcd.126720/gov.uscourts.dcd.126720.1.0.pdf.
21 Carrasco, supra note 6; Indictment as to Zhenli Ye Gon at 1–2, United States v. Ye Gon,
No. 1:07-cr-00181-EGS (D.D.C. July 26, 2007), available at http://ia600407.us.archive.org/
21/items/gov.uscourts.dcd.126720/gov.uscourts.dcd.126720.3.0.pdf.
22 Chavez Affidavit, supra note 20, at ¶¶ 5, 11, 24.
23 Id. at ¶¶ 25–26 (emphasis of party names omitted).
24 Id. at ¶¶ 21.
25 Sands Non-Pros. Agreement, supra note 6, at 591.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Suspicious Transaction Reports Rule, 31 C.F.R. § 1021.320(a)(2)(i) (2014).
29 See Sands Non-Pros. Agreement, supra note 6, at 586–87, 591; see also Steve Kanigher,
Las Vegas Sands Agrees to Return Money to U.S. Government, 8NEWSNOW (Aug. 27, 2013,
4:24 PM), http://www.8newsnow.com/story/23271739/las-vegas-sands-agrees-to-return-
money-to-us-government (discussing the contents of the non-prosecution agreement).
30 See Sands Non-Pros. Agreement, supra note 6, at 587.
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• Ye Gon wired money to the Venetian and Palazzo from nine different
financial institutions in total, all located in Mexico: two banks and
seven “casas de cambio.”31 Ye Gon would send funds from various
different financial institutions during the course of a single trip, some-
times even in a single day.32 The government deemed the use of so
many financial institutions in quick succession a red flag—particularly
since casas de cambios had been the subject of a previous FinCEN
money laundering advisory.33
• Ye Gon sent at least three of these wire transfers (totaling over $1.5
million) to a Sands subsidiary in Hong Kong, rather than to Las Vegas
directly, leading prosecutors to infer that Ye Gon sought to avoid the
more stringent reporting requirements of U.S.-based casinos.34
• Ye Gon wired certain amounts from the same institutions in successive
days, appearing to break large transfers into smaller, less conspicuous
transactions.35 When casino staff asked him to make larger wire trans-
fers—because keeping up with the incremental wires was quite bur-
densome—Ye Gon declined.36 According to one witness, “Ye Gon
stated that he preferred to wire the money incrementally because he did
not want the government to know about these transfers.”37
• Ye Gon identified at least seven different originators for his wire trans-
fers.38 That is, he told casino staff that his funds were coming from
accounts in the name of five distinct entities, as well as from two indi-
viduals.39 In the prosecutors’ view, the fact that Ye Gon was receiving
funds from accounts not in his own name raised suspicion, because—
due to the high number of wire transfer originators—casino staff could
only link Ye Gon to two of the originating entities through public
record searches, and the staff could not determine any of the entities’
ownership.40 Further, the two individuals referenced in the wire trans-
fers appeared not to be related either to Ye Gon or to each other.41
31 See id. Casas de cambio, or “money exchange houses,” are relatively lightly regulated
and pose a problem for Anti-Money Laundering enforcement agencies. Chavez Affidavit,
supra note 20, at n.2; see also FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT—
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM: MEXICO, 48
(2008), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20
Mexico%20ful.pdf.
32 Sands Non-Pros. Agreement, supra note 6, at 588.
33 Id. at 587–88; see also Chavez Affidavit, supra note 20, at n.2 (discussing casas de
cambios and how Ye Gon utilized them for his wire transfers).
34 See Sands Non-Pros. Agreement, supra note 6, at 587.
35 Id. at 587, 590.
36 Id. at 590.
37 Id. Another casino executive recalled the circumstances differently, saying that Ye Gon
declined to combine his wire transfers because he “was superstitious about sending large
amounts of money to the Venetian at one time for fear of losing all the money at once.” Id.
38 Id. at 587, 590.
39 Id. at 587.
40 Id. at 587, 589–90.
41 See id. at 590–91.
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• The paperwork for many of Ye Gon’s wire transfers failed to designate
him as the beneficiary of the transactions.42 Because Ye Gon was not
obviously linked to any one of his originators, the government saw this
as further cause for suspicion.43 One wire designated the Venetian-
Palazzo as the beneficiary, and only designated Ye Gon upon follow-
up inquiry.44 On other occasions where no beneficiary was listed, the
Venetian failed to make any follow-up inquiry, even though it was
casino policy to do so.45
• Finally, Ye Gon requested that, for “privacy” reasons, the Venetian
receive funds into an account not bearing the name of a casino.46 After
consulting its in-house counsel and compliance officers, Sands agreed
to receive funds from Ye Gon into an account held in the name of
“Interface Employee Leasing”—an account used to pay pilots operat-
ing the company’s private jets that had never before been used to
receive wire transfers from casino patrons.47 Although counsel author-
ized Ye Gon to use the Interface Employee Leasing account only “one
time,” Ye Gon sent fifteen wire transfers to this account, totaling
approximately $5.2 million.48
In the view of the U.S. Attorney’s Office (“USAO”), the above irregulari-
ties—Zhenli Ye Gon’s use of different financial accounts, held in different,
seemingly unrelated names; his tendency to break wire transfers up in to
smaller tranches, without a coherent, legitimate explanation; his failure to des-
ignate himself as a wire transfer beneficiary; his routing of wire transfers
through foreign jurisdictions; and perhaps most significantly, his insistence on
the use of a name-neutral account to receive the funds—required a more timely
and robust response from Sands.49 Deeming Sands complicit in Ye Gon’s
money laundering and in his evasion of financial reporting requirements, the
USAO pursued a criminal investigation against the corporation.50
On August 26, 2013, Sands and the USAO entered into a non-prosecution
agreement, effectively resolving the criminal investigation.51 Under this deal,
the USAO agreed to not prosecute Sands on charges of conspiracy (in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 371) or willful failure to file a SAR-C (in violation of 31 U.S.C.
§§ 5318(a) and 5322(a)), or on any other “related” charges.52 In exchange,
Sands agreed to forfeit to the government $47,400,300 of the funds received
42 Id. at 587.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 589.
45 Id. at 590.
46 Id. at 588.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 590.
49 Id. at 586–87, 591.
50 Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Office for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., Operator of Venetian Resort
in Las Vegas Agrees to Return Over $47 Million After Receiving Money Under Suspicious
Circumstances (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/usao/cac/Pressroom/2013/110.html
[hereinafter Sands Press Release].
51 Sands Non-Pros. Agreement, supra note 6, at 584.
52 Id.; Sands Press Release, supra note 50.
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from or on behalf of Ye Gon.53 The company also made detailed public disclo-
sures about its relationship with Ye Gon and agreed to enhance its AML proce-
dures, for instance by adjusting the compensation incentives of casino
employees and forbidding the use of name-neutral bank accounts.54 Finally,
Sands agreed to enhanced reporting requirements for a two-year period, with
the understanding that if the company failed to make these required reports (or
otherwise was deemed to breach the agreement), prosecution on the foregone
charges might be initiated.55
As the USAO intimated in its accompanying press release, the “related”
criminal charges referenced in the Sands non-prosecution agreement include
the federal criminal code’s far-reaching money laundering provisions.56
Among these are:
• 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), which makes it a felony to knowingly conduct
a transaction with the proceeds of certain unlawful activities for the
purpose of promoting the unlawful activity, violating tax laws, con-
cealing the source or owner of the funds, or evading state or federal
reporting requirements;57 and
• 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a), which makes it a felony to knowingly conduct a
transaction in property derived from certain unlawful activities, regard-
less of specific purpose, so long as the property in question exceeds
$10,000 in value.58
The federal criminal case against Ye Gon, interestingly, did not include
charges of money laundering.59 In fact, in a strange twist, the Department of
Justice’s Criminal Division moved to dismiss Ye Gon’s indictment in June
2009 so that he could be extradited to Mexico to face money laundering and
related charges there.60 But this is of small solace to Sands, as the develop-
ments in Ye Gon’s personal criminal proceedings obviously did not deter the
USAO for the Central District of California, or its cooperating federal law
enforcement agencies, from investigating the events at the Venetian and
Palazzo. Indeed, these agencies view the Sands case as part of their broader
efforts to improve AML compliance and, in particular, to change the culture
among Las Vegas-based gaming companies.61 As U.S. Attorney Andre Birotte
Jr. put it:
53 Sands Press Release, supra note 50.
54 Sands Non-Pros. Agreement, supra note 6, at 591–92.
55 Id. at 585, 592.
56 Sands Press Release, supra note 50.
57 Laundering of Monetary Instruments, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2012).
58 Engaging in Monetary Transactions in Property Derived from Specified Unlawful Activ-
ity, 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (2012). Sections 1956 and 1957 both target, primarily, the proceeds of
“specified unlawful activity,” including, inter alia, illegal drug sales. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1956(c)(7)(B)(i), 1957(f)(3). However, while the funds must in actuality pertain to speci-
fied illegal activity, a defendant need only be aware of a general criminal connection in order
to be found liable. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1), 1957(a).
59 Indictment, supra note 21, at 1–2.
60 Mot. to Dismiss at 2–4, United States v. Ye Gon, No. 1:07-cr-00181-EGS (D.D.C. Jun.
22, 2009); see also Gon v. Holt, 774 F.3d 207, 209 (4th Cir. 2014) (affirming extradition of
Ye Gon to Mexico).
61 See Sands Press Release, supra note 50.
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What happens in Vegas no longer stays in Vegas . . . . For the first time,
a casino has faced the very real possibility of a federal criminal case for
failing to properly report suspicious funds received from a gambler.
This is also the first time a casino has agreed to return those funds to the
government. All companies, especially casinos, are now on notice that
America’s anti-money laundering laws apply to all people and every
corporation, even if that company risks losing its most profitable
customer.62
B. Additional Developments
Of course, the Sands case was not worked up in a vacuum. At this point,
there is at least a decade-long history of the federal government pursuing crimi-
nal investigations against corporations only to ultimately negotiate non- or
deferred prosecution agreements that include expansive corporate cooperation,
monitoring, and institutional reform provisions.63 Though the actual prosecu-
tion of large business entities to date has been relatively rare, the risks for a
criminally targeted corporation are obviously enormous—enough so that many
companies faced with a credible prosecution threat will readily agree instead to
bear the (sometimes quite onerous) burdens of cooperation, monitoring, and
reform, in addition to fines and other monetary penalties.64 And the govern-
ment, for its part, has come to rely on corporate cooperation as a means of
amplifying and projecting its power, deterring and incapacitating would-be
individual criminals, and supporting the investigation and prosecution of indi-
vidual targets and defendants.65 Questions have certainly been raised—and
likely will continue to be raised—regarding the fairness and constitutionality of
the government effectively “deputizing” private companies to assist in law
enforcement.66 Still, though the rules have been tweaked around the edges,67
the government can be expected to continue its efforts to leverage organiza-
tions’ regulatory, civil, and criminal exposure into institutional reforms
designed to enhance compliance.
62 Id.
63 See generally, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV.
853, 888–90 (2007) (detailing the emergence of the “pre-trial diversion agreements” that are
now regularly used by the Department of Justice).
64 See id. at 855, 890; Susan B. Heyman, Bottoms–Up: An Alternative Approach for Investi-
gating Corporate Malfeasance, 37 AM. J. CRIM. L. 163, 166 (2010).
65 See Heyman, supra note 64, at 166–67; Harry First, Branch Office of the Prosecutor: The
New Role of the Corporation in Business Crime Prosecutions, 89 N.C. L. REV. 23, 2831,
45–49 (2010).
66 See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 63, at 856–57; Heyman, supra note 64, at 166; see generally
Miriam H. Baer, Organizational Liability and the Tension Between Corporate and Criminal
Law, 19 J. L. & POL’Y 1, 12–14 (2010) (discussing corporate governance and the tensions
between corporate law and criminal investigations).
67 See, e.g., Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Dep’t.
Components and U.S. Att’ys (Dec. 12, 2006), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/
legacy/2007/07/05/mcnulty_memo.pdf (directing that federal prosecutors, except in unusual
cases, are precluded from requiring corporations to waive privileges or forego paying
employees’ legal fees as a condition of a non- or deferred prosecution agreement).
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Indeed, the government has been especially assertive in the AML context.
Notably, on December 11, 2012, the Department of Justice entered into a
deferred prosecution agreement with HSBC Bank USA (“HSBC”), wherein the
bank admitted to violating parts of the Bank Secrecy Act68 by “willfully failing
maintain an effective anti-money laundering (AML) program [and] willfully
failing to conduct due diligence on its foreign correspondent affiliates.”69  Like
Sands, HSBC admitted that it ignored “evidence of serious money laundering
risks associated with doing business in Mexico”; and like Sands, HSBC agreed
to beef up its AML compliance structures and cooperate with the government,
and consented to substantial forfeitures in order to avoid prosecution.70 Prose-
cutors fielded some public criticism that the HSBC deferred prosecution agree-
ment was too lenient,71 but in approving the agreement, the district court
concluded that it “imposes upon HSBC significant, and in some respect
extraordinary” remedial measures.72
With respect to the gaming industry in particular, prosecutors and regula-
tors have indicated that enhanced AML measures are warranted in the after-
math of Sands. FinCEN’s recently appointed director, Jennifer Shasky
Calvery—formerly the chief of DOJ’s Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering
Section73—told a Las Vegas gaming convention in September 2013 that the
industry needed to “make a cultural change”:74
When some casinos say that they are in the gaming business and not
really in the business of providing financial services, I get the impres-
sion that they are saying that they should not have as much responsibil-
ity [as banks] in the AML context . . . . I fear there may be a culture
within some pockets of the industry of reluctant compliance with the
bare minimum, if not less . . . .
But whether a company is in the business of helping people invest and
protect their money, or using that money for the purpose of entertain-
ment, both are at risk. Both can serve as the vehicle for the use and
movement of ill-gotten gains. And just like everyone else, casinos are
responsible for reporting suspicious activity when they suspect that the
money being brought to them for gaming derives from an illegal
source.75
68 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5324 (2012).
69 Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Bank Agrees to Enhanced Compliance Obligations, Over-
sight by Monitor in Connection with Five-year Agreement (Dec. 11, 2012), http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hsbc-holdings-plc-and-hsbc-bank-usa-na-admit-anti-money-launder
ing-and-sanctions-violations [hereinafter HSBC Press Release].
70 Id.
71 United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *7
(E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) (memorandum and order granting deferred prosecution agreement).
72 Id. at *11.
73 See Biography of Jennifer Shasky Calvery, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, http://
www.fincen.gov/about_fincen/pdf/bio_director.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2015).
74 John L. Smith, Reluctant Casinos Get Clear Warning, LAS VEGAS REV.–J. (Sept. 29,
2013, 12:12 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/columns-blogs/john-l-smith/reluctant-casi
nos-get-clear-warning.
75 Shasky Calvery, supra note 2, at 2–3.
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Kevin Rosenberg, the Assistant U.S. Attorney who prosecuted Sands, was
even more blunt than Ms. Shasky Calvery: “We’re not going to hesitate to go
where the evidence takes us and where the money is, so if it happens to be
other casinos, then so be it.”76  In fact, in fall 2013, a second gaming company,
Caesars Entertainment Corporation, disclosed that it was under grand jury
investigation regarding potential money laundering offenses.77 FinCEN stated
that it was determining “whether it [was] appropriate to assess a civil penalty
and/or take additional enforcement action against Caesars Palace.”78 The chair-
man of the Nevada Gaming Control Board added that, “[i]f federal laws have
been violated, that could very well lead to disciplinary action based upon
Nevada gaming laws.”79
In sum, the post-Sands climate seems to be a perilous one for gaming
companies. The confluence of several factors—a national-headline-grabbing
case, an expansive AML regulatory regime, the ascendance of a core group of
aggressive government officials, and broader trends in corporate criminal pros-
ecution (not to mention the potential for sizable asset forfeitures that can flow
into budget-strapped agency coffers)80—has elevated money laundering crimes
to the top tier of various law enforcement agencies’ priorities and placed the
gaming industry squarely in the crosshairs.
In order to withstand the elevated scrutiny from federal and local agencies,
and ultimately to avoid organizational money laundering liability, the govern-
ment has urged casinos to review their internal controls and to enhance their
AML compliance processes. What follows are several suggestions for strength-
ening AML compliance.81
76 Alexandra Berzon, Casinos Heed U.S. Reporting Warning, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 2, 2013,
7:04 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732432440457904389135592
7758.
77 Howard Stutz, Caesars Palace under Investigation for Possible Money Laundering, LAS
VEGAS REV.–J. (last updated Oct. 21, 2013, 4:50 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/busi
ness/caesars-palace-under-investigation-possible-money-laundering.
78 Id.
79 Christopher Palmeri, Caesars under Pressure as Officials Probe Activities, BLOOMBERG
(Oct. 22, 2013, 7:40 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-22/caesars-under-pres
sure-as-officials-probe-activities.html.
80 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-736, JUSTICE ASSETS FORFEITURE FUND:
TRANSPARENCY OF BALANCES AND CONTROLS OVER EQUITABLE SHARING SHOULD BE
IMPROVED 2 (2012) (“All federal law enforcement agencies within DOJ participate in the
Asset Forfeiture Program . . . as well as other agencies not part of DOJ . . . . Often, state and
local law enforcement agencies participate in joint investigations with DOJ’s law enforce-
ment agencies . . . . [and] can receive a portion of the proceeds of forfeited assets resulting
from these investigations in the form of cash or property through DOJ’s equitable sharing
program.”); see also id. at 10 (providing examples of how forfeitures may arise in money
laundering cases).
81 Editor’s Note: On December 4, 2014, the American Gaming Association released their
“Best Practices for Anti-Money Laundering Compliance.” The best practices set forth in that
document in some ways mirror the suggestions presented here, however gaming companies
would still be wise to consider the suggestions in this article in conjunction with those set out
by the AGA. See generally American Gaming Association Best Practices for Anti-Money
Laundering Compliance, AM. GAMING ASS’N (Dec. 2014), http://www.americangaming.org/
sites/default/files/aga-best-practices-re-aml-compliance-122014.pdf.
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II. COMPLIANCE RECOMMENDATIONS
First, several caveats should be noted: there are no hard-and-fast formulas
or algorithms for detecting potential money laundering. As detailed below,
quantitative analysis can be invaluable, but it is probably not sufficient; there
are simply too many ways to conceal or mislead as to the source and nature of
funds, and they cannot all be distilled into a computer program or employee
handbook. Moreover, in some circumstances, there are going to be legal or
operational complications that may inform a particular company’s AML poli-
cies. For example, U.S. companies operating casinos abroad may not be
allowed or able to obtain certain information from patrons.82 Or, counsel may
have to reconcile the implementation of financial incentives and disciplinary
policies with obligations under employment contracts. And of course, in all
events, the particular directives and guidance of regulators and law enforce-
ment should feature prominently in constructing AML procedures. Ultimately,
at the granular level, there are few if any “one size fits all” rules.
It is therefore apt to think in terms of “guidelines” and institutional struc-
tures to: (a) take in information regarding transactions occurring on the prem-
ises; (b) make sure that information is transmitted to someone in a position to
assess the organization’s risks; and (c) react accordingly, weighing the short-
term benefits of potential revenue from a patron against the many longer-term
risks associated with government scrutiny. In light of Sands and other recent
money laundering cases, non-compliance risks appear more acute, and a more
conservative balancing may thus be warranted. Sands’ experiences with Zhenli
Ye Gon, and its subsequent non-prosecution agreement, suggest a number of
steps that could be taken to improve AML compliance and reduce the risk of
liability:
1. Compliance departments should pre-clear certain high-risk
customer relationships. Traditionally, casinos have limited the screen-
ing of new players to their ability to repay debts.83 Now, the industry
trend seems to be toward a more comprehensive screening for prospec-
tive high-volume players—a review assessing not only creditworthi-
ness, but also “suitability.”84  Some preclearance was done even in the
case of Ye Gon (he was asked for employment information and checked
against OFAC “prohibited parties” lists), but the USAO was hardly sub-
82 See, e.g., A Window on China, ECONOMIST, Dec. 10, 2011, at 69–70, available at http://
www.economist.com/node/21541417 (discussing Macau’s unique set of money laundering
issues and concerns, including the semi-state-sanctioned intermediaries known as “junkets”
that interact with casinos on behalf of patrons from mainland China).
83 See Mary Jacoby, Casinos and the Banks Secrecy Act: A Q&A About Anti-Money Laun-
dering Compliance, JUST ANTI–CORRUPTION (Jan. 8, 2014, 5:42 PM), http://www.main
justice.com/justanticorruption/2014/01/08/casinos-and-the-bank-secrecy-act-a-qa-about-anti-
money-laundering-compliance/.
84 See id. Casinos are not alone in their increased scrutiny of which customers they do
business with. Robin Sidel & Andrew R. Johnson, U.S. Banks Steer Clear of Sensitive Cus-
tomers, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2014, 8:04 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424
052702304856504579342550507179032 (discussing the U.S. banks’ increasing hesitation of
working with customers and businesses whose activities may bring unwanted government
scrutiny).
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tle in suggesting that additional steps should have been taken.85 Where
local law permits, casinos can mitigate AML liability risks by insisting
on verifiable employment and/or wealth-source information—some-
thing that can be checked against public records accessible on the
Internet or on proprietary databases—particularly if the patron has
played, or proposes to play, with a high volume of cash. In addition, as
the USAO suggested in Sands, casinos may wish to scrutinize the “foot-
print” of the patron’s purported business or employer.86 Query, for
instance, whether a company identified by the patron has a presence as
would be expected in the stated industry or as would appear consistent
with its business needs (whether a retailer has a website or brick-and-
mortar address, etc.).87 Finally, if bank accounts held in the name of
someone other than the patron are used, similar information should be
elicited to confirm the patron’s link to the account-holding individual or
entity; and the said individual or entity should also be checked against
“prohibited parties” lists.88 Of course, any information obtained from
the patron during preclearance should be documented meticulously.
Most importantly, preclearance should involve personnel who are
tasked primarily with compliance, and not simply left to sales and mar-
keting staff—though sales and marketing staff should of course also be
trained in compliance procedures and AML risks.89 Ultimately, as the
industry moves toward more robust preclearance for high-volume play-
ers (and even periodic “re-clearance” for certain of the highest-risk
patrons), the enforcement and regulatory risks of lagging behind mag-
nify; conversely, the competitive downside to mandating preclearance is
reduced.
2. Play needs to be monitored responsibly, and “red flags” need to
result in SAR-C filings. Needless to say, if SAR-Cs or CTRs are not
filed when they should be, then a casino is not going to be deemed
AML-compliant.90 And as the Sands investigation shows, when a
patron’s play exhibits certain irregularities—particularly multiple or
repeated irregularities—the government will be extremely skeptical of
an “honest mistake” defense and will readily conclude that the failure to
file a SAR-C was willful.91 As alluded to above, the case of Ye Gon is
instructive in that it fairly comprehensively illustrates some of the more
common “red flags” that casino staff will likely encounter92:
• use of another person(s) bank account, without explanation;
• use of a conspicuously large number of banks or bank accounts;
• non-obvious links to such bank accounts;
85 Sands Non-Pros. Agreement, supra note 6, at 589, 591.
86 Id. at 590.
87 Id.
88 See id. at 591.
89 AM. GAMING ASS’N, supra note 81, at 7.
90 See, e.g., Mirage Pays $5 Million Fine for Cash Violations, LAS VEGAS SUN (June 20,
2003, 10:58 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2003/jun/20/mirag-pays-5-million-
fine-for-cash-violations/.
91 See Sands Non-Pros. Agreement, supra note 6, at 591.
92 See supra Part I.A.
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• use of different bank accounts in short succession;
• many small transactions in lieu of a small set of larger ones
(i.e., seeming to break up of large transactions into stages);
• use of suspect financial institutions (e.g., casas de cambio,
which were the subject of a FinCEN advisory);
• patrons asking to superfluously route financial transactions
through foreign countries (in Ye Gon’s case, Hong Kong);
• failure to designate the patron as the beneficiary of wire
transfers;
• reluctance to designate the casino as the recipient of wire trans-
fers, to the point of requesting use of a name-neutral recipient
account;93
• refusal to simplify transactions upon casino staff’s request;
• strange appeals to superstition (e.g., the patron stating that it is
bad luck to simplify financial transactions); or
• repeated requests for privacy and secrecy, particularly from a
non-public figure.
The Ye Gon red-flag list is comprehensive, though by no means exhaus-
tive. For example, casino staff should also be mindful of high-volume
cash deposits followed by small wagers or hedged bets, as this is a time-
honored method of laundering illegally-procured funds.94  Again, staff
training is critical.
3. Casinos should consider re-reviewing SAR-Cs post-filing to
identify and assess risks in ongoing relationships. The curious case of
Zhenli Ye Gon aside, casinos do tend to file SAR-Cs when patrons
engage in blatantly suspicious activity. Federal law enforcement offi-
cials seem to acknowledge as much, even if in a backhanded way—
witness FinCEN Director Shasky Calvery’s faint praise (and concern)
that most casinos are at least doing the “bare minimum” to combat
money laundering, even if they are doing so reluctantly.95 Law enforce-
ment’s real gripe, therefore, is that casinos aren’t doing more: the con-
cern is that SAR-Cs are filed with the Treasury and then subsequently
ignored, while a blissfully “compliant” casino continues to do lucrative
business with the suspect patron. But as Sands and HSBC suggest, the
filing of a SAR-C—even a timely and comprehensive SAR-C—does
not necessarily create a safe harbor from money laundering liability.96
As with HSBC, regulators and prosecutors will require casinos to
“maintain an effective anti-money laundering program and to conduct
93 N.B.: the use of intermediaries and name-neutral accounts may have a tax evasion objec-
tive instead of, or in addition to, a pure money laundering goal.
94 See, e.g., Adam Shapiro, Comment, Hold ’Em or Fold ’Em: Gambling Laws in Asia, 29
PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 385, 403 (2010); Jonathan Gottfried, The Federal Framework for
Internet Gambling, 10 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 26, ¶¶ 20–21 (2004), available at http://
jolt.richmond.edu/v10i3/article26.pdf.
95 Shasky Calvary, supra note 2, at 3.
96 Berzon, supra note 76.
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appropriate due diligence.”97 Toward this end, SAR-C filings are essen-
tial, but they are not in and of themselves sufficient.
Compliance departments can, however, look at previously filed
SAR-Cs the way law enforcement agencies do—as a wealth of informa-
tion and a great resource for detecting patterns of problematic activity.
The systematic internal re-review of SAR-Cs could be important in
identifying high-risk patron relationships. Where appropriate, this could
provide a basis for terminating, declining to expand, or further inquiring
into such relationships. In reviewing SAR-Cs filed in connection with a
particular patron, it may be helpful to bring in fresh sets of eyes; the
perspective of personnel who were not involved in initially generating
the report(s) can be quite valuable in assessing prospective risks.
4. Casinos should improve internal information-sharing mecha-
nisms. Like many large operations, casinos have historically had diffi-
culties with the inadvertent “compartmentalization” of risk-related
information.98 The various components of a casino—hosts, marketing
staff, floor personnel, compliance departments, and others—have
tended to operate in separate spaces, each in pursuit of their own dis-
tinct, immediate objectives. As a result, when it comes to assessing
patrons’ play and financial transactions, the left hand has not always
known what the right hand is doing. In no small measure, improving
AML compliance is ultimately a matter of improving information-shar-
ing among casino personnel.99
In particular, risk assessment has to be integrated into every com-
ponent’s mission, and compliance staff needs to periodically meet with
and establish relationships with key operations personnel. Hosts, han-
dlers, and dealers need to be trained to identify suspicious activity, and
they need to be conversant in and able to identify breaches in casino
rules (such as the Venetian’s rules concerning no-beneficiary-desig-
nated transfers, which were routinely disregarded when casino person-
nel dealt with Ye Gon). Casino staff must know to report suspicious
activity and rules violations to the pertinent compliance office. Failure
to report, particularly a failure to report rules violations, needs to be
taken seriously and result in adverse personnel action where appropri-
ate—indeed, if one staff-member repeatedly fails-to-report, heightened
concern may be warranted, as this may suggest an integrity issue.
Although internal reporting requirements need to be enforced vig-
orously, reporting itself should be as easy and burden-free as possible.
The lower the transaction costs involved in reporting an issue, the more
reports compliance departments are likely to receive. This may mean
97 HSBC Press Release, supra note 69.
98 For a general exposition of this phenomenon in a non-gaming context, see U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-471, INFORMATION SHARING: AGENCIES COULD BETTER
COORDINATE TO REDUCE OVERLAP IN FIELD-BASED ACTIVITIES (2013).
99 Shasky Calvery, supra note 2, at 4 (“The sharing of information [among the various
departments] is especially critical for casinos that develop significant information on their
gaming customers. This information would be useful for the compliance department to assist
in monitoring customers for suspicious activity.”).
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setting up a hotline or inbox for reporting suspicious activity, or it may
mean setting up a comparable channel for staff members to report an
issue to compliance without their peers and/or immediate supervisors
necessarily being made aware. Internal reporting mechanisms should be
user-friendly. And in no event should a staff member’s submission of a
bona fide report be allowed to result in an adverse personnel conse-
quence of any kind (including assignment to less lucrative shifts, etc.).
5. Casinos should consider adjusting financial incentives so that
staff can internalize and address money laundering risks. The
“bonus structure” provision of the Sands non-prosecution agreement
has received some attention; under this provision, Sands agreed to
incorporate employees’ contributions to AML compliance as a factor in
determining bonuses.100 More strikingly, Sands agreed to “clawback”
bonuses for staff-members, including “personnel in casino sales, casino
cage, casino credit, and relevant personnel in surveillance, security,
compliance, and finance, as well as those with management oversight
over the foregoing” who were deemed “to have contributed to compli-
ance failures.”101 The result is a potent carrot-and-stick approach: if a
staff-member strengthens the company’s AML compliance, she can get
a larger bonus; but if she hinders AML compliance, she can lose her
bonus altogether. Other casinos may see fit to emulate Sands’
approach—though admittedly, the clawback rule can be a harsh one.
Perhaps the rule can be tempered in a way that further encourages infor-
mation sharing. For example, sales bonuses can be subject to clawback
in the event of an AML failure, unless the staff member timely reported
the subject activity to the compliance department.
An additional takeaway from Sands concerns the pay of compli-
ance personnel themselves. In the non-prosecution agreement, the
USAO noted with disapproval that “individuals involved in compli-
ance” were among the Sands and Venetian employees whose bonuses
were impacted by the volume of Ye Gon’s play.102 In order to ensure
the integrity of compliance staffers’ risk assessments, casinos should
take care that the compensation of compliance officers is not in any way
significantly affected by a particular patron’s play.
6. To the extent possible, temptations to facilitate money launder-
ing should be removed. Ultimately, the Sands Corporation’s exper-
iences with Zhenli Ye Gon should counsel a measure of humility in all
levels of casino management and compliance departments. In some cir-
cumstances, even highly trained, rigorously screened, and well-super-
vised casino personnel are going to be tempted to assist a high-volume
patron engaging in suspicious activity. Therefore, in addition to all of
the above recommendations, it is imperative that point-personnel simply
be unable to accommodate some of the customer’s requests. In this
vein, and with the Ye Gon experience fresh in mind, Sands agreed to
100 Sands Non-Pros. Agreement, supra note 6, at 591.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 588.
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prohibit the use of name-neutral company bank accounts.103 Other casi-
nos should consider renaming such accounts or closing them altogether.
Similarly, gaming companies should consider reducing staff members’
discretionary power by either prohibiting outright, or mandating man-
agement approval for, certain higher-risk activities, such as receiving
funds from third-party bank accounts or suspect financial institutions.
Gaming regulators and law enforcement officials have long urged casinos
to “know their customers.” In the Sands case, federal prosecutors emphatically
joined the chorus. What this means—from a casino management perspective—
is that money laundering risks arising from a patron’s play have to be systemat-
ically and rigorously assessed. As discussed above, by enhancing its risk-
assessment processes, a gaming company not only will ensure compliance
going forward, it will show regulators and law enforcement officials that it is
operating in good faith. If a casino patron is ultimately deemed to have run
afoul of the law, a showing of good faith may be the determining factor as to
whether or not the government holds the gaming company responsible as an
accomplice to money laundering.
103 Id. at 592.
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